An employer that denies a religious accommodation has to prove undue hardship, which FEHA section 12926(u) defines as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense,” and federal law moved closer to that standard in 2023. In Groff v. DeJoy, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the old reading of Title VII that let employers refuse any accommodation costing more than a trivial amount. Under both laws, a denial has to rest on a documented burden to the business, after the employer has looked at more than one option.
What does California law require?
Accommodation unless the employer proves undue hardship. Government Code section 12940(l)(1) makes it unlawful to refuse to hire, fire, or discriminate against a person “because of a conflict between the person’s religious belief or observance and any employment requirement,” unless the employer shows it explored available alternatives and can’t accommodate the practice without undue hardship.
The statute names the alternatives. The employer has to show it “has explored any available reasonable alternative means of accommodating the religious belief or observance, including the possibilities of excusing the person from those duties that conflict with the person’s religious belief or observance or permitting those duties to be performed at another time or by another person,” according to section 12940(l)(1).
Religious belief or observance is defined broadly. The statute says it includes “observance of a Sabbath or other religious holy day or days, reasonable time necessary for travel prior and subsequent to a religious observance, and religious dress practice and religious grooming practice” as defined elsewhere in FEHA. Scheduling requests are the most common, but dress and grooming requests are covered on the same terms.
How does FEHA define undue hardship?
More than an inconvenience. Government Code section 12926(u) defines “Undue hardship” as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense,” weighed against factors that include the cost of the accommodation, the financial resources of the facility and the business, the number of employees, and the type of operations.
That definition applies to religious accommodation through section 12940(l)(1), which cross-references it. It’s a size-sensitive test. A cost that’s an undue hardship for a 30-person business may not be for a 3,000-person company, and the employer has to make its case with its own numbers.
What did Groff v. DeJoy change?
The federal standard. Gerald Groff was a mail carrier who believed Sunday should be devoted to worship and rest. When his Postal Service station began Sunday deliveries for Amazon, he refused to work Sundays, received progressive discipline, and eventually resigned, according to the opinion. Lower courts ruled for the Postal Service under a long-standing reading of an earlier case that treated anything “more than a de minimis cost” as undue hardship.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected that reading. “We think it is enough to say that an employer must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business,” the Court wrote in Groff v. DeJoy (2023) 600 U.S. 447. It vacated the judgment and sent the case back for the lower courts to apply the clarified standard.
For California employers, the practical effect is that federal and state standards now point the same way. Before Groff, an employer could win a Title VII claim on a showing that would fail under FEHA. That gap has narrowed, and an employee’s lawyer may plead both.
Do coworker complaints count as hardship?
Only in part. Groff held that effects on coworkers matter only to the extent they affect the conduct of the business. And it said that hardship caused by coworkers’ hostility to a religion, or to the idea of accommodating religion, can’t be counted. If bias could supply a defense, the Court explained, “Title VII would be at war with itself,” according to Groff.
That doesn’t make coworker impact irrelevant, and it’s worth separating the two kinds of evidence early in any dispute. Real operational effects, like chronic short staffing on a shift or safety coverage that can’t be filled, can support a hardship defense when they’re documented. Grumbling about fairness, without more, won’t.
| Question | California (FEHA) | Federal (Title VII after Groff) |
|---|---|---|
| Hardship standard | Significant difficulty or expense, weighed by listed factors such as cost and business size | Increased costs that are large relative to the conduct of the particular business |
| Alternatives to consider | Excusing the duty, another time, or another person, by statute | Other options, such as voluntary shift swapping |
| Coworker effects | Weighed as part of the operational impact | Count only if they affect the business, and never when based on hostility to religion |
| Dress and grooming | Can’t be accommodated by segregating the employee | Covered as religious practice |
| Retaliation for asking | Barred whether or not the request is granted | Barred under Title VII’s retaliation provision |
What does the employer have to try before saying no?
More than one option. Groff said Title VII requires an employer to actually accommodate an employee’s religious practice, and that assessing whether one proposed accommodation is reasonable doesn’t satisfy that duty, according to the opinion. The Court added that concluding other employees would have to work overtime isn’t enough, and that options such as voluntary shift swapping also have to be considered.
California’s statute builds that requirement into the text by naming the alternatives an employer has to explore. An employer that rejects the one accommodation the employee asked for, without asking about others, is in a weak position under either law.
California also adds two limits. An accommodation of religious dress or grooming “is not reasonable if the accommodation requires segregation of the individual from other employees or the public,” under section 12940(l)(2). Moving an employee to a back-room role to keep a head covering or beard out of view isn’t a defense. And section 12940(l)(4) bars retaliation against a person for requesting an accommodation, “regardless of whether the request was granted.”
The firm’s post on the interactive process covers the disability side of FEHA’s accommodation rules. Many of the same documentation habits apply to religious requests.
After a religious accommodation request or claim
- Preserve the request, every response to it, the schedules and staffing records for the affected shifts, the dress or grooming policy, and the emails and texts among the managers involved.
- Calendar the response deadline on any CRD complaint, EEOC charge, or lawsuit, and check for an arbitration agreement and an employment practices liability (EPLI) policy with notice terms.
- Identify who received the request and who decided it, and stop any action against the employee that could look like retaliation for asking.
- Pull the numbers behind any hardship claim (overtime costs, coverage gaps, safety requirements) and a record of the alternatives considered, including swaps and schedule changes.
- Get legal advice before denying a request, disciplining the employee over the conflict, or responding to an agency.
Documentation decides most of these cases. The firm handles religious accommodation disputes as part of its California employment defense practice, and its post on CRD complaints and right-to-sue notices covers how FEHA claims start.
Religious accommodation questions employers ask
Can we ask for proof that a belief is religious?
Carefully. FEHA protects religious belief or observance, and some limited inquiry may be appropriate when an employer has an objective basis to question whether a request is religious. But the inquiry should be limited and respectful. A demand for clergy letters or a debate about doctrine invites a discrimination claim, and most requests should be handled on their terms.
Is paying overtime to cover a shift an undue hardship?
Not automatically. Under section 12926(u), the question is whether the cost rises to undue hardship for this employer, given its size and resources. Whether occasional premium pay for a substitute qualifies depends on the employer’s size and resources and on how often the cost recurs. Recurring costs that the employer can quantify are a stronger basis, and they carry more weight for a small operation.
Does Groff apply to California employers?
Yes, for Title VII claims, which apply to employers with 15 or more employees for each working day in 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year. FEHA reaches further. Section 12926(d) defines an employer to include any person “regularly employing five or more persons,” so many small businesses that Title VII doesn’t cover still face the state standard in section 12926(u). Employees may plead both, so the company should be ready to defend the decision under each.
Can we deny a request that conflicts with a safety rule?
Sometimes. A genuine safety requirement can support a hardship defense, but the employer should still look for alternatives, such as a different role, protective equipment that fits the practice, or a modified procedure. The record should show the safety risk and why each alternative didn’t work.
If your company is facing a religious accommodation claim
If your company has received a CRD complaint, an EEOC charge, or a lawsuit over a religious accommodation request, the record of the alternatives considered and the cost evidence usually decide how much of the claim is real. Rosenberger + Kawabata represents employers defending employment lawsuits and claims through its business litigation practice, including claims involving religious accommodation and discrimination. Contact Rosenberger + Kawabata online for a confidential consultation, or call (310) 894-6921.
Sources
The statutes are Government Code section 12940 and Government Code section 12926. The case is Groff v. DeJoy (2023) 600 U.S. 447.
This post is general information about California and federal employment law as of November 7, 2026. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Employment statutes, regulations, and court decisions change often, and the outcome of any claim depends on its facts. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes.