TCPA Standing: Can One Text or Call Get a Case Dismissed?

Usually not on its own. I don’t know of a federal appeals court that still holds one unwanted text or call too trivial to count, and the Ninth Circuit, which covers California, sets no minimum number of messages. Standing still matters. It decides which court hears the case, and it can shrink a class when absent members can’t show an injury traced to the violation. A business facing a one-text complaint usually has more standing arguments than the complaint suggests.

What does Article III standing require in a TCPA case?

A concrete injury traceable to the defendant that a court can remedy, not just a violation of the statute on paper.

Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to actual cases and controversies. The Supreme Court held in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” A plaintiff can’t sue over a bare technical violation that harmed nobody.

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez sharpened the rule in 2021: “No concrete harm, no standing.” The Court explained that intangible harms can qualify when they bear a close relationship to harms American courts have traditionally recognized, and it named intrusion upon seclusion as one of them, citing then-Judge Amy Coney Barrett’s opinion in Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, a case about unwanted texts.

That citation is why I think TransUnion did TCPA defendants less good than many expected. The decision tightened standing in a credit-reporting case, but it pointed to unwanted texts as the kind of privacy intrusion that counts.

How does the Ninth Circuit treat one or two unwanted texts?

As a concrete injury, without counting.

In Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, a former gym member sued over two promotional texts. The court wrote that “Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients,” and held that he had alleged a concrete injury. The reasoning speaks of unsolicited calls and texts generally. It doesn’t set a floor.

The defendants still won Van Patten. The court affirmed summary judgment because the plaintiff had given his number in a context that covered the texts and hadn’t revoked his consent. Standing got him in the door, and consent ended the TCPA claim. Our post on the scope of consent covers that test in more detail.

Two years after TransUnion, the court applied the rule again. In Hall v. Smosh Dot Com, the plaintiff owned a phone whose number was on the National Do Not Call Registry (the federal list of numbers whose owners have opted out of telemarketing), and her son used it. The court held she had standing as the owner and subscriber, and it added that “prior express consent is relevant to the merits of a TCPA claim, not to Article III standing.” The court left open whether a subscriber who authorized someone else to consent would have standing. In a California federal court, don’t dress a consent defense up as a standing motion. It’s a merits defense, and it belongs in a merits motion.

A separate point sometimes gets confused with standing. A Do Not Call claim requires “more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity,” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). That’s an element of the claim written into the statute, not an Article III rule. One text can still support a claim under § 227(b) if, without the recipient’s prior express consent, it was sent with an autodialer (equipment that can store or produce numbers using a random or sequential number generator and dial them) or used an artificial or prerecorded voice (a message recorded in advance or generated by machine). In January 2026, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed in Howard v. Republican National Committee that a text message is a call under the TCPA, and our post on that video-text ruling explains why a text carrying a video with a recorded voice still wasn’t a call made using a prerecorded voice.

Is there still a circuit split over a single text?

Not on the basic question since 2023, as far as I’ve found.

The split came from the Eleventh Circuit. In Salcedo v. Hanna, it held in 2019 that one text message wasn’t a concrete injury, describing the harm this way: “Annoying, perhaps, but not a basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Other circuits went the other way. The Third Circuit found standing from a single prerecorded voicemail in Susinno v. Work Out World, and the Fifth Circuit rejected Salcedo’s reasoning in Cranor v. 5 Star Nutrition, concluding that “Cranor has alleged a cognizable injury in fact: nuisance arising out of an unsolicited text advertisement.”

Then the Eleventh Circuit reheard the issue en banc. In Drazen v. Pinto, a unanimous en banc court held in July 2023 that “the receipt of an unwanted text message causes a concrete injury.” The opinion counted seven other circuits that had held one or two unwanted texts or calls resemble the harm behind intrusion upon seclusion.

So I’d stop citing Salcedo in California briefs. Its own circuit reached the opposite result en banc, and a Ninth Circuit judge will read a Salcedo-based motion as a request to ignore Van Patten. The disagreement that’s still open concerns class certification, and that one helps defendants.

Where do standing arguments still work?

On traceability, and on the people who never sued.

An injury has to be fairly traceable to the violation the plaintiff alleges, not just to the fact that a call or text happened. In Cordoba v. DIRECTV, a class sued over a vendor’s failure to keep an internal do-not-call list. The Eleventh Circuit held that class members who never asked to stop receiving calls “were not injured by the failure to comply with the regulation,” because the calls would have continued even with a perfect list. The named plaintiff had asked repeatedly and had standing. The court vacated certification of the internal do-not-call class. I think Cordoba is the most useful standing case a California TCPA defendant can cite, even though it doesn’t bind courts here.

The Ninth Circuit has borrowed its approach. In Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative v. Bumble Bee Foods, the en banc court cited Cordoba and TransUnion for the rule that “Rule 23 also requires a district court to determine whether individualized inquiries into this standing issue would predominate over common questions.”

For any company facing a texts-after-STOP or internal do-not-call class action, I’d treat the opt-out log as standing evidence. Every proposed class member who never replied STOP or otherwise asked to stop is a Cordoba problem for the plaintiff, and the company is usually the only party holding the records that sort them.

TransUnion also says standing “is not dispensed in gross.” A plaintiff must show it for each claim and each form of relief, so someone who opted out months ago and stopped getting messages may struggle to justify an injunction even if a damages claim survives.

How does a business raise standing, and when?

By motion under Rule 12(b)(1), whenever the facts support it, and again at class certification. Our post on motions to dismiss TCPA complaints covers the Rule 12(b)(6) arguments to pair with it.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 lets a defendant move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and standing is part of that jurisdiction. In Leite v. Crane Co., the Ninth Circuit described two kinds of challenge. A facial attack accepts the complaint’s allegations and argues they fall short. A factual attack “contests the truth of the plaintiff’s factual allegations, usually by introducing evidence outside the pleadings,” and the plaintiff then has to prove standing with evidence. If platform records show a message never reached the number, or that the plaintiff neither owned nor used it, a factual attack is the right tool, though Leite also says that when a jurisdictional fact is intertwined with the merits and the parties dispute it, the court must leave it to the trier of fact. I wouldn’t file a facial attack on a one-text complaint in the Ninth Circuit. Van Patten answers it.

The issue never expires. Rule 12(h)(3) provides that “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action,” so facts learned in discovery can support a later motion.

Before filing one, think about where the case goes next. The Supreme Court held in Mims v. Arrow Financial Services that “federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over private suits arising under the TCPA.” Article III binds only federal courts. Justice Thomas, dissenting in TransUnion and quoting the Court’s 1989 decision in ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, noted that state courts “are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law.” A standing win in federal court may just move the case across the street.

Removal raises the same issue from the other direction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” A company that removes a case and then wins on standing has bought a trip back to state court. For a one-text individual case, I’d usually prefer to stay in federal court and win on consent or the elements of the claim.

What happens to standing at class certification?

It becomes a predominance fight, which is where it has the most force.

TransUnion held that “Every class member must have Article III standing in order to recover individual damages.” A footnote in the same opinion left the timing open: “We do not here address the distinct question whether every class member must demonstrate standing before a court certifies a class.” In the Ninth Circuit, Olean rejected a flat rule against certifying a class with more than a handful of uninjured members, while requiring the district court to decide whether sorting injured from uninjured members would overwhelm the common questions.

The Supreme Court agreed to decide a closely related question, whether a federal court may certify a Rule 23 damages class that includes both injured and uninjured members, in a case from the Ninth Circuit, and then backed away. In Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis, the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted on June 5, 2025. Justice Kavanaugh dissented and wrote: “I would hold that a federal court may not certify a damages class that includes both injured and uninjured members.” As of this post, the question is still open. I’d build a certification opposition around the records that separate injured members from uninjured ones, because that’s the argument Olean leaves room for.

Standing arguments and how they fare in California federal courts

Before you file a standing motion or remove the case

1. Put a litigation hold on the message logs and delivery receipts for the plaintiff’s number and every campaign named in the complaint, along with the consent records behind them.
2. Pull the opt-out and internal do-not-call records with dates, since they show which proposed class members ever asked to stop.
3. Pull the National Do Not Call Registry scrub records and the version dates used for those campaigns.
4. Collect the vendor and lead-source contracts, plus the message templates and any recorded or AI-voice files.
5. Talk to a lawyer before responding to the complaint, removing it, or contacting the plaintiff, because the first filing shapes which court hears the standing question.

When a claim involving a single text or call is filed as a proposed class action, the firm’s page on defending TCPA class actions in California covers what comes next.

Questions about TCPA standing defenses

Can one text support a TCPA class action in California?

As far as Article III goes, yes. The Ninth Circuit treats an unsolicited telemarketing text sent in violation of the TCPA as a concrete injury, with no minimum count. A Do Not Call claim is different, because the statute requires more than one call in 12 months. In a one-text class case, the better standing arguments target the absent members.

Is a TCPA case dismissed for lack of standing over?

Often not. A federal court that lacks jurisdiction doesn’t decide the merits, and the TCPA lets plaintiffs sue in state court, where Article III doesn’t apply, though state standing rules do. A removed case gets remanded, not dismissed. A standing win can still be worth having, for example to break up a federal class, but weigh where the case will land before filing the motion.

Should we argue the plaintiff consented, so there’s no injury?

Not as a standing argument in the Ninth Circuit, because Hall treats consent as a merits issue. Make it on the merits, with the dated sign-up record and the wording the plaintiff agreed to. That’s how the defendants won the TCPA claim in Van Patten, and it’s usually a stronger motion than a standing challenge to someone who received the texts.

Does TransUnion mean uninjured class members can’t recover?

It means they can’t recover individual damages in federal court. TransUnion didn’t decide whether every member must show standing before a class is certified, and the Supreme Court declined to resolve that question in Labcorp. In the Ninth Circuit, the issue is handled through Rule 23’s predominance requirement, so the defense needs evidence showing how many class members lack an injury tied to the violation.

If your company faces a one-text TCPA complaint

If your company has been sued over a single text or call, the forum and the opt-out records usually matter more than the number of messages. Rosenberger + Kawabata represents businesses defending TCPA lawsuits and class actions through its business litigation practice, including claims built on a single text message or call. Contact Rosenberger + Kawabata online for a free and confidential consultation, or call (310) 894-6921.

Sources

The statute is the Telephone Consumer Protection Act at 47 U.S.C. § 227. The procedural rules are Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The Supreme Court decisions are Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021); Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 565 U.S. 368 (2012); and Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis, No. 24-304 (U.S. June 5, 2025).

The Ninth Circuit decisions are Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2017); Hall v. Smosh Dot Com, Inc., 72 F.4th 983 (9th Cir. 2023); Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc); Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2014); and Howard v. Republican National Committee, No. 23-3826 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026).

The other circuit decisions are Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019); Drazen v. Pinto, 74 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc); Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2019); Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346 (3d Cir. 2017); and Cranor v. 5 Star Nutrition, L.L.C., 998 F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 2021).

This post is general information about the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and related laws as of February 10, 2026. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Courts and the FCC change the rules in this area often, and the outcome of any claim depends on its facts. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes.