Steidinger Doesn’t End TCPA Text Liability: What Still Applies

A company that beats a Do Not Call text claim under the TCPA has knocked out one theory, not the whole lawsuit. In Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, the Seventh Circuit held that a text message isn’t a telephone call under the statute’s Do Not Call private right of action. Where it applies, that’s a clean early win. But it leaves a company’s exposure under other parts of the TCPA, and under state law, untouched. The pleadings decide how much it actually helps.

What the Seventh Circuit Held in Steidinger

The court held that the TCPA’s Do Not Call private right of action reaches telephone calls, not text messages.

In Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026), the plaintiffs sued over marketing texts urging them to buy home sleep tests, relying on 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). That provision lets a person sue after receiving “more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity” in violation of the Federal Communications Commission’s Do Not Call rules, the federal rules built around the registry of numbers that have opted out of telemarketing. Reading the statute by its ordinary meaning in 1991, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “texts are not calls, so § 227(c)(5) does not authorize the plaintiffs’ suit,” and it affirmed the dismissal.

The decision binds federal courts in the Seventh Circuit, which reaches Illinois and the neighboring districts in Indiana and Wisconsin. Everywhere else it’s persuasive authority only, and courts have come out both ways on the question, so a company that texts nationwide can draw one answer in one courthouse and the opposite answer across a state line. That divide is live because of a separate change in the law: under McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146 (2025), a district court in a private TCPA suit decides what the statute means on its own, giving the FCC’s reading respectful consideration but not binding deference.

Does a texts-are-not-calls win end the lawsuit?

Usually not. It ends one count.

Steidinger answered a single, narrow question: whether the statutory phrase telephone call reaches texts. The court was careful about what it wasn’t deciding. It set aside the Supreme Court’s and other circuits’ decisions that treat texts as calls by pointing out those cases arose under a different provision, § 227(b). In the court’s own words, “all of these cases concern claims brought under § 227(b), not § 227(c)(5).” It made the point again at the close, explaining that spam texts “may be curbed through agency action pursuant to other provisions of § 227, which we leave undisturbed.”

So the ruling trims the complaint. It doesn’t wipe out claims a plaintiff pleaded under other theories. A business that reads the headline as a rule that texts can’t violate the TCPA is reading it wrong.

Which TCPA text claims survive the ruling?

The autodialer and recorded-voice claims under § 227(b), and claims under state law.

Section 227(b) is the TCPA’s other private right of action, and it’s the one most marketing-text suits actually run on. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b), it’s unlawful “to make any call” to a cell phone, without the recipient’s prior express consent, “using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice,” meaning a recorded or computer-generated message instead of a live person. Courts have long read the word call in § 227(b) to include texts. As the Seventh Circuit noted, the Ninth Circuit put it directly: “a text message is properly deemed to be a ‘call’ within the meaning of the TCPA.” Steidinger didn’t disturb that line of cases. It distinguished the two provisions, saying § 227(b) and § 227(c)(5) “contain different language,” and that subsection (b)’s private right of action is “broadly framed.”

Two cautions keep this honest. The autodialer theory is narrower than plaintiffs often assume. After Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. 395 (2021), an automatic telephone dialing system has to use “a random or sequential number generator,” and most platforms that send targeted marketing texts don’t work that way. So a § 227(b) autodialer claim is far from automatic. The recorded-voice branch of § 227(b) is a separate matter, and where a text campaign ties to an artificial or prerecorded voice message, that element can be easier for a plaintiff to reach.

State law is the other survivor. The Steidinger plaintiffs also pleaded a claim under the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act, and the district court got rid of that claim only by declining supplemental jurisdiction, not on the merits. Several states have their own calling-and-texting statutes, and some reach texts in plain terms. A federal Do Not Call dismissal does nothing to a parallel state claim.

TCPA theoryStatutePer-violation exposureDoes Steidinger dispose of it?
Do Not Call private right47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)Up to $500 per call, up to three times that if the violation was willful or knowingYes for texts in the Seventh Circuit, persuasive only elsewhere
Autodialer or recorded-voice claim47 U.S.C. § 227(b)$500 per violation, up to $1,500 if willful or knowingNo
State mini-TCPA or FTSAState statutesVaries by stateNo

Why the complaint’s wording decides how much Steidinger helps

Because the ruling removes only the § 227(c)(5) count, the value of the motion depends on what else the plaintiff put in the complaint.

Two situations play out differently. If a complaint rests only on texts under § 227(c)(5), a motion raising the texts-are-not-calls defense can end the whole case early, before discovery costs pile up, because it’s a pure question of law. If the complaint also pleads § 227(b) or a state statute, the same motion trims the case without ending it, and the fight shifts to consent and to whether the sending platform even qualifies as an autodialer.

One detail in Steidinger is worth sitting with. The plaintiffs there had received both texts and calls, but a footnote records that they “didn’t contend below or on appeal that their suit could proceed based on the alleged calls alone,” so the court treated the point as waived. A plaintiff who preserves the voice-call theory, or who pleads § 227(b) next to the Do Not Call count, hands the defense less to knock out on the pleadings. The takeaway for a company served with one of these complaints is to read every count before celebrating, and to check whether the texts went out through equipment or a recorded voice that could pull § 227(b) back into the case.

What to pull together when a text claim lands

When a demand letter or a complaint over texts shows up, the record is what decides these cases, so get it locked down before anything is lost.

  1. Put a litigation hold on the call and text logs and the messaging-platform data, along with the consent records for every number at issue, before a routine retention schedule purges them.
  2. Pull the opt-out and internal do-not-call logs, with the date each request came in and the date messaging to that number actually stopped.
  3. Pull the National Do Not Call Registry scrub records, and note which version of the list was used and when.
  4. Gather the vendor and lead-source contracts, the message scripts, and any recorded or artificial-voice files, because those are what determine whether § 227(b) is in the case.
  5. Talk to a lawyer before answering the demand, contacting the plaintiff, or offering anything to settle, since an early statement can undercut a defense that would otherwise win on the pleadings.

The firm’s work defending TCPA class actions in California often comes down to exactly this question of which counts a motion can reach and which it can’t.

If Your Company Is Defending a Do Not Call Text Claim

If your company is accused of texting consumers whose numbers were on the Do Not Call list, whether the case ends on a motion or grinds into discovery often comes down to which TCPA provisions the complaint actually pleads. Rosenberger + Kawabata represents businesses defending TCPA lawsuits and class actions through its business litigation practice, including claims involving texts sent to numbers on the Do Not Call Registry. Contact Rosenberger + Kawabata online for a confidential consultation, or call (310) 894-6921.

Sources

Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026): CourtListener

Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227

This post is general information about the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and related laws as of November 12, 2026. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Courts and the FCC change the rules in this area often, and the outcome of any claim depends on its facts. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes.

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