The government-debt exception is gone, but the robocall restriction it was attached to is not. In July 2020, the Supreme Court held that the 2015 exception for federal debt collection calls violated the First Amendment, and it removed the exception instead of the rule. Collectors of federal student loans and other government debt now need consent for autodialed or prerecorded calls to cell phones, like everyone else. The open questions are about calls made between 2015 and 2020, and they cut differently depending on the debt.
What did the Supreme Court decide in Barr v. AAPC?
It struck the exception and kept the ban. In Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., 591 U.S. 610 (2020), decided July 6, 2020, Justice Kavanaugh’s plurality opinion concluded: “We hold that the 2015 government-debt exception added an unconstitutional exception to the law. We cure that constitutional violation by invalidating the 2015 government-debt exception and severing it from the remainder of the statute.”
The plurality explained its choice of remedy in plain terms. It wrote that “the correct result in this case is to sever the 2015 government-debt exception and leave in place the longstanding robocall restriction.” The Sixth Circuit later summarized the decision the same way, noting that “The Court also held that the exception was severable from the rest of the restriction, leaving the general prohibition intact,” in Lindenbaum v. Realgy, LLC, 13 F.4th 524 (6th Cir. 2021).
The plaintiffs in Barr were political organizations that wanted to make robocalls to cell phones. They won the constitutional argument and lost the remedy. Their calls stayed illegal without consent, and the government-debt collectors lost their exemption.
What did the exception say, and is it still in the statute?
It’s still printed in the U.S. Code. The cell phone provision at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) still ends with an exception for a call “made solely to collect a debt owed to” the United States or backed by it. Congress never repealed that language. The Supreme Court held it unconstitutional and severed it, so courts read the statute as if it weren’t there.
That creates a trap for anyone checking the statute directly. A compliance team or vendor reading the code text can come away thinking federal-debt calls are exempt. They aren’t, and they haven’t been since the 2020 decision. Any written policy that cites the exception should be updated.
Can companies be liable for robocalls made from 2015 to 2020?
Most can, at least in the Sixth Circuit. A defense theory that emerged after Barr argued that the robocall restriction was unenforceable while the unconstitutional exception was on the books. The district court in Lindenbaum accepted that theory and dismissed the case. The Sixth Circuit reversed.
The court held that severance doesn’t change the statute after the fact. “severance is interpretation, not legislation,” the court wrote, and the Supreme Court’s reading of the statute without the exception “applies retroactively.” Realgy, which had made calls advertising electricity services in 2019 and 2020, faced the claim on the merits.
The Supreme Court’s own footnote supports the same result. Footnote 12 of the plurality opinion states that the decision “does not negate the liability of parties who made robocalls covered by the robocall restriction.” A company that made marketing robocalls to cell phones without consent between 2015 and 2020 shouldn’t expect Barr to erase that exposure. The argument is weak after Lindenbaum, and a business should plan its defense around consent, the dialing equipment, and the call records instead.
What about collectors who relied on the exception?
They have a better argument, though no appellate court has settled it. The same footnote in Barr states that “no one should be penalized or held liable for making robocalls to collect government debt after the effective date of the 2015 government-debt exception and before the entry of final judgment by the District Court on remand in this case, or such date that the lower courts determine is appropriate.”
The Sixth Circuit treated that footnote as persuasive only. In Lindenbaum, the court said “No other justice indicated agreement with that dictum, so it is relevant only to the extent of its power to persuade.” It also left the question open, stating “We need not decide whether Realgy is correct about government-debt collectors because this case does not present the issue.”
The court did describe the defense. It said fair notice “turns on whether it reasonably believed that the statute expressly permitted its conduct.” A federal student loan servicer or collector that made calls solely to collect government debt during those years has a real fair-notice argument, and it should be raised early. The argument is narrower for calls that mixed government and private accounts, because the exception covered only calls made “solely” to collect federal debt.
Going forward, the practical fix is consent. Federal-debt servicers that dropped consent capture during the exception years should confirm their account-opening and servicing records now include the cell phone consent language the rest of the industry uses. A servicer that can’t show consent for a number should switch that number to manual calls without prerecorded messages until it can.
| Caller and period | Status after Barr | Where the defense starts |
|---|---|---|
| Marketing robocalls to cell phones, 2015 to 2020 | Liable in the Sixth Circuit under Lindenbaum | Consent records and dialing equipment |
| Calls solely to collect federal debt, 2015 to July 2020 | Fair-notice defense left open | Account records showing the debt was federal |
| Calls mixing federal and private debt, 2015 to 2020 | Exception covered only calls made solely for federal debt | Call purpose and account mix for each number |
| Any autodialed or prerecorded call to a cell phone after Barr | No government-debt exemption | Consent records |
Does Barr make the TCPA vulnerable to other First Amendment challenges?
Not the core rule. The plurality’s reasoning undercuts broader challenges to the robocall restriction itself. It said that “A generally applicable robocall restriction would be permissible under the First Amendment,” in the opinion’s severability discussion. Defendants who argue that the whole restriction is unconstitutional are fighting the Supreme Court’s own framing.
The better use of Barr in a defense is narrower. It confirms that courts read the TCPA as Congress wrote it, minus the defect. That fits the way the Court read the autodialer definition in 2021, which the earlier post on autodialer defenses after Duguid covers. For calls by political groups, which were the plaintiffs in Barr, see the post on nonprofit and political calls and texts.
What to gather when a claim involves 2015 to 2020 calls
- Put a litigation hold on call logs, dialer settings, prerecorded message files, and consent records for the numbers involved.
- Export any opt-out or internal do-not-call entries for those numbers, with their dates.
- Pull the Registry scrub records and version dates used for any marketing campaigns during the period.
- Collect the servicing contracts, account records showing whether each debt was federal, and any vendor or collector agreements.
- Talk to a lawyer before responding to a demand, contacting the claimant, or offering to settle.
More on the firm’s approach is on its page for TCPA defense lawyers.
Questions about the government-debt exception
Can federal student loan servicers make robocalls without consent?
No. Since Barr, autodialed and prerecorded calls to cell phones need the called party’s prior express consent whether the debt is federal or private. The exception language still appears in the U.S. Code, but the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional and severed it. Servicers should treat federal accounts the same as any other account for TCPA purposes.
Did Barr v. AAPC strike down the whole TCPA?
No. The Court struck only the 2015 exception for calls to collect government debt. The general restriction on autodialed and prerecorded calls to cell phones stayed in place, and the plurality said a generally applicable robocall restriction would be permissible under the First Amendment. The Do Not Call rules weren’t at issue in the case.
Is a company liable for robocalls it made before Barr was decided?
Usually, yes. The Sixth Circuit held in Lindenbaum v. Realgy that the Supreme Court’s reading of the statute applies retroactively, so the restriction applied to non-government-debt calls the whole time. Collectors who made calls solely to collect federal debt may have a fair-notice defense, which the Sixth Circuit described but didn’t decide.
Does the Lindenbaum decision bind courts outside the Sixth Circuit?
No. It binds federal courts in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee. Courts elsewhere may find it persuasive, and the Supreme Court footnote it relied on points the same way for non-government-debt calls. A business defending a 2015 to 2020 claim in another circuit should check how its own district has ruled.
Defending claims over federal debt collection calls
If your company is accused of making robocalls to collect federal debt, or of marketing robocalls made between 2015 and 2020, the purpose of each call and the account records behind it usually decide which defenses apply. Rosenberger + Kawabata represents businesses defending TCPA lawsuits and class actions through its business litigation practice, including claims involving prerecorded debt collection calls. Contact Rosenberger + Kawabata online for a confidential consultation, or call (310) 894-6921.
Sources
The decisions are Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., 591 U.S. 610 (2020) and Lindenbaum v. Realgy, LLC, 13 F.4th 524 (6th Cir. 2021). The statute is 47 U.S.C. § 227.
This post is general information about the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and related laws as of June 8, 2026. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Courts and the FCC change the rules in this area often, and the outcome of any claim depends on its facts. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes.