Can Owners and Officers Be Personally Liable Under the TCPA?

Yes, an owner or officer can be sued personally under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and some complaints name the CEO alongside the company. Being named isn’t the same as being liable. Most courts ask whether the individual had direct, personal participation in the calls or texts, or personally authorized them. A title, a stake in the company, or general responsibility for compliance doesn’t meet that test. An executive who stayed out of the campaign’s details, and can show it, has a real defense.

When can an owner or officer be personally liable for TCPA violations?

When the person took part in or authorized the conduct that broke the rules, not because of the job title alone.

The statute itself doesn’t mention officers, so when it says “It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States” to make certain calls, under 47 U.S.C. § 227, and gives private plaintiffs $500 per violation (up to $500 for Do Not Call claims, or actual losses if greater), or up to $1,500 if a court finds the violation willful or knowing, it leaves open who besides the company counts. Courts filled the gap with the rule tort law applies to corporate officers.

The leading case is a 2001 Texas decision, Texas v. American Blastfax, which held the company’s two officers jointly and severally liable with the company for unsolicited fax ads. The court reasoned that “Individuals who directly (and here, knowingly and wilfully) violate the TCPA should not escape liability solely because they are corporate officers.” According to the court’s findings, the officers kept sending faxes after the court had ruled the conduct unlawful.

The test from that case has spread widely. Assuming without deciding that this kind of liability exists, the Third Circuit summarized the test in City Select Auto Sales v. David Randall Associates: an officer may be liable if the officer “had direct, personal participation in or personally authorized the conduct found to have violated the statute, and was not merely tangentially involved.”

What doesn’t count matters as much. The Seventh Circuit rejected a claim against a CEO who knew his company sent the faxes but didn’t design, send, or oversee them, holding in Arwa Chiropractic v. Med-Care Diabetic & Medical Supplies that “Mere knowledge is insufficient.”

How have the Ninth Circuit and California federal courts ruled?

The Ninth Circuit hasn’t decided the question, so district courts in the circuit have borrowed the participation test.

An Oregon federal court said so directly in Ott v. Mortgage Investors Corp., writing “Although the Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this issue” before adopting the test. I haven’t found a Ninth Circuit decision since then that resolves it, and the district courts discussed below have applied the participation test without waiting for one. The complaint in Ott alleged that executives designed the company’s telemarketing, disabled its do-not-call lists, and that three of them “personally received numerous emails concerning requests to stop the calls” but kept the calls going. The court let those claims proceed, describing the executives, as alleged, as acting “much as a puppeteer pulls a puppet’s strings.”

California federal courts have reached results on both sides:

A CEO allegedly involved in choosing the calling equipment stayed in. In Mora v. Zeta Interactive Corp., the Eastern District of California denied the CEO’s motion to dismiss. The complaint alleged he “specifically, individually, and personally directed and authorized all of the unlawful calls” and was involved “including the selection of the calling equipment.” Those allegations were made on information and belief, and the court still found them enough at the pleading stage. It also declined to consider the CEO’s own declaration on a motion to dismiss.

Two officers sued far from home were dismissed. In Moser v. Health Insurance Innovations, the Southern District of California dismissed a Florida company’s president and vice president, without prejudice, for lack of personal jurisdiction. According to the order, the only allegation tying them to the calls was an information-and-belief statement that they made the calls, ordered them made, knew of them and did nothing, or were willfully and recklessly ignorant of them, and being the company’s only managers didn’t let the court disregard the corporate form.

Individuals who defaulted lost. In Rojas v. Bottom Line Concepts, the Central District of California entered a default judgment that included two individuals. Because they had defaulted, the court took the complaint’s allegations as true and held that the complaint adequately alleged “direct, personal participation on the part of” both, which was enough for individual liability. It noted that the “TCPA permits joint and several liability amongst co-tortfeasors,” quoting an earlier decision.

A Washington federal court in the same circuit drew the line in Dawson v. Porch.com. Allegations that a CEO held the title and was responsible for TCPA policies and training were not enough, the court said, calling officer liability based on position alone “a proposition that has been repeatedly rejected by the courts.” But allegations that he built the texting system and directed employees to send the messages survived. “These allegations may or may not be true,” the court wrote, but they were enough to plead a claim.

Does the corporate form protect an executive from TCPA claims?

Only partly. Incorporating protects owners from liability based on their status, but it doesn’t protect anyone from claims based on what they did personally.

That’s the reasoning behind American Blastfax and the courts that followed it: the officer isn’t liable for the company’s acts, but for their own. A plaintiff using that theory doesn’t need to pierce the corporate veil or prove the company was a sham, since the claim is about what the executive did personally and not about how the business was organized. I’d treat the entity as necessary but not sufficient.

There’s a stronger version of the corporate-form argument, and it belongs in every officer’s defense. In City Select, the Third Circuit first questioned whether an officer acting for the company is a “sender” of faxes at all, asking whether Congress meant courts to “look behind the corporate form and impose personal liability on officers who act on the corporation’s behalf rather than their own.” The court added a second doubt: “We doubt as well, however, whether such common-law personal-participation liability is available against corporate officers under the TCPA.” It decided the appeal without resolving that doubt, and it affirmed a jury verdict clearing the company’s president. The Seventh Circuit also left the question open in Arwa, saying it had not decided whether personal-participation liability is available under the TCPA.

Candor about this matters. City Select itself traced the participation test to a “longstanding consensus among district courts” that federal common law governs officer liability, and the Seventh Circuit has upheld a CEO’s liability “including, on that case’s facts, the personal liability of the chief executive officer,” as Arwa described an earlier appeal. I’d raise the City Select argument in any Ninth Circuit case where an officer is named, because nothing binding forecloses it here. I wouldn’t build the whole defense on it.

Which defenses work for a named owner or officer?

Three defenses run through the cases above, and they can work together.

No personal involvement. This is a fact defense, and the officers in Arwa and City Select both won it on the evidence. In Arwa, the CEO got summary judgment because the evidence showed only that he knew about the faxes. In City Select, a jury cleared the president after conflicting testimony about his role.

Insufficient pleading. A complaint that names the CEO and alleges only that the CEO directed and authorized the calls is vulnerable. How much detail is enough varies by judge. Mora let fairly general allegations through, while Dawson rejected allegations resting on title and compliance duties. I’d bring a motion to dismiss whenever the complaint relies on title, ownership, or generic compliance duties.

Personal jurisdiction. An officer sued in a state where they never acted personally can challenge the court’s power over them, as the officers in Moser did. That defense has limits. Ott rejected it for executives alleged to have run the calling program that reached the forum state.

Here’s how the common allegations have fared:

How can an owner limit personal TCPA exposure before a claim?

The records that protect an officer are mostly the same ones that protect the company. In my view, the owners who end up personally exposed are rarely the ones who ignored the TCPA. They’re the ones whose names are on the approvals.

Give TCPA compliance a named owner below the CEO, in writing, with authority over consent capture, opt-out handling, and Registry scrubs. Keep executives out of approving call lists, lead purchases, and scripts unless compliance has signed off first. In my view, an email from the CEO telling the team to send a campaign anyway, over a compliance objection, is one of the worst documents an officer can have.

Act fast on complaints and demand letters. In both American Blastfax and Ott, the executives kept faxing, or were alleged to have kept calling, after being told about the problem. I’d also review vendor contracts, which bear on whether the company answers for a vendor’s calls at all.

Check two documents before you need them: the company’s governing documents on indemnification and advance payment of defense costs for officers, and the directors and officers policy. Coverage for TCPA claims is its own fight, and it’s worth knowing where the company stands before a claim arrives.

If you’ve been named personally, start here

1. Put a litigation hold on the company’s call and text logs, dialer and platform data, and consent records, and on the named individual’s own email and messages about the campaigns.
2. Pull the opt-out and internal do-not-call logs with dates, plus a record of who had authority to change suppression settings.
3. Pull the National Do Not Call Registry scrub records and version dates, and who approved each campaign’s list.
4. Collect vendor and lead-source contracts, scripts, recorded or AI-voice files, and the org charts or delegation memos showing who actually ran calling.
5. Talk to a lawyer before the response deadline, and before contacting the claimant or offering anything, so no one defaults and the company and officer can decide whether they need separate counsel.

The firm’s TCPA defense lawyers page summarizes how claims involving owners and officers named personally are defended.

Questions executives ask about personal TCPA liability

Does forming an LLC protect me from TCPA claims?

It protects you from liability based only on owning the company, but it doesn’t protect you from claims that you personally directed or approved the calls, because that theory rests on your own conduct and not on the company’s. The entity still matters. In a side discussion of whether the president was a “sender,” City Select noted that only the company contracted with and paid the fax vendor.

Can a plaintiff sue the CEO just because they run the company?

A plaintiff can name anyone, but a claim based only on the title is weak. Dawson rejected allegations resting on a CEO’s position and compliance duties. The plaintiff needs facts showing the CEO took part in or authorized the conduct. A motion to dismiss is often the right first response when the complaint has nothing more.

Will company insurance cover an officer named personally?

Maybe. Directors and officers policies generally cover individual executives, but the answer depends on the policy’s grant of coverage, its exclusions, and any endorsements. I’d read the actual policy, not the summary, and give notice early. Late notice can create its own coverage problem, separate from the TCPA claim.

Should the officer and the company share a lawyer?

Often they can, but not always. Their interests can split if the company’s defense points to a rogue executive, or if the officer’s defense points to a subordinate or vendor who ran the campaign without the officer’s approval. That’s a conflicts question to answer at the start, with informed written consent if one lawyer represents both.

When an executive is named in a TCPA suit

If your company’s owner or an officer has been named personally in a TCPA lawsuit, the delegation records and the executive’s own emails usually decide whether the claim survives. Rosenberger + Kawabata represents businesses defending TCPA lawsuits and class actions through its business litigation practice, including claims naming owners and officers personally. Contact Rosenberger + Kawabata online for a free and confidential consultation, or call (310) 894-6921. For claims brought by repeat filers, see our guide to defending serial TCPA plaintiffs.

Sources

The statute is the Telephone Consumer Protection Act at 47 U.S.C. § 227.

The court decisions are Texas v. American Blastfax, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 892 (W.D. Tex. 2001); City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. David Randall Associates, Inc., 885 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2018); Arwa Chiropractic, P.C. v. Med-Care Diabetic & Medical Supplies, Inc., 961 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2020); Ott v. Mortgage Investors Corp. of Ohio, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1046 (D. Or. 2014); Mora v. Zeta Interactive Corp., No. 1:16-cv-00198 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2016); Moser v. Health Insurance Innovations, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-1127 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018); Dawson v. Porch.com, No. 2:20-cv-00604 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2024); and Rojas v. Bottom Line Concepts, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-02667 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2025).

This post is general information about the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and related laws as of May 5, 2026. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Courts and the FCC change the rules in this area often, and the outcome of any claim depends on its facts. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes.