Who Can Sue Under the TCPA? Subscribers, Users, and Bystanders
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act lets “A person or entity” sue over an unlawful robocall, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). That sounds unlimited, and it isn’t. Courts read it to cover the subscriber and usually a regular user of the line. A houseguest who picks up is likely outside it, and so is someone who buys phones to collect claims. For a business facing a TCPA suit, the plaintiff’s tie to the number is a defense worth checking first.
Who does the statute say can sue?
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) creates the robocall and autodialer claim, and its gatekeeping language is broad. It begins: “A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State” an action for an injunction, for actual loss, or “to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater.” A court may raise the award up to three times that amount if the violation was willful or knowing.
§ 227(c)(5) creates the Do Not Call claim, and it’s narrower on its face. It belongs to “A person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection.” The regulations it points to protect a “residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry,” under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2). (The National Do Not Call Registry is the federal list of numbers whose owners don’t want sales calls.)
Statutory standing differs from Article III standing, which asks whether the plaintiff suffered a concrete injury at all. Article III has its own case law on Article III standing fights over a single text. The Third Circuit put the difference this way in Leyse v. Bank of America: “Statutory standing goes to whether Congress has accorded a particular plaintiff the right to sue under a statute, but it does not limit the power of the court to adjudicate the case.”
Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1), is the vehicle for a statutory standing argument, because the issue isn’t jurisdictional. Leyse held it was error for the trial court to hear a second pre-answer motion raising it, since the bank could have included it in the first one. The court excused the mistake as harmless, but the lesson is cheap to follow: put every plaintiff-status argument in the first motion to dismiss.
Can someone sue if the call was meant for another person?
Yes, under Leyse v. Bank of America and N.L. v. Credit One Bank, a person the caller never meant to reach can still bring a claim.
In Leyse, the plaintiff shared a landline with a roommate who was the subscriber and the person Bank of America’s telemarketer meant to reach. The district court dismissed him as an unintended recipient. The Third Circuit reversed, writing: “It is the actual recipient, intended or not, who suffers the nuisance and invasion of privacy.” It held that his status as a regular user of the line and an occupant of the home put him within the “zone of interests” the statute protects. The phrase comes from the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lexmark International v. Static Control Components, which Leyse applied as a “presum[ption] that a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests ‘fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.’”
In N.L. v. Credit One Bank, the Ninth Circuit, whose decisions bind federal courts in California, reached the same result through the consent defense. The bank’s vendors placed 189 automated calls to a reassigned number that an eleven-year-old used as his own phone. The bank argued that its customer, the person it meant to call, had consented. The court held that “Credit One’s intent to call a customer who had consented to its calls does not exempt Credit One from liability under the TCPA when it calls someone else who did not consent.” It noted that the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits had already rejected the same intended-recipient reading. The jury’s award of $500 per call, $94,500 in all, was affirmed.
A reassigned number carries the sharpest version of this risk, because the person now holding it never agreed to anything the old customer signed. For how the Ninth Circuit’s other holdings fit together, see the Ninth Circuit TCPA decisions that bind California businesses.
Can a roommate, child, or houseguest sue?
A regular user who lives at the home usually can sue, and a visitor who happens to pick up usually can’t.
Leyse drew the line in plain terms: “a mere houseguest or visitor who picks up the phone would likely fall outside the protected zone of interests.” On the other side, the court wrote that “a regular user of the phone line who occupies the residence being called undoubtedly has the sort of interest” Congress meant to protect, an interest “in privacy, peace, and quiet.”
Most contested plaintiffs fall somewhere between the roommate and the houseguest, and the facts decide which one they resemble more. An adult child who answers a parent’s landline once a month during visits is closer to the houseguest. A caregiver who lives in the home and answers the phone daily is closer to the roommate. Campaigns aimed at older homeowners raise this question often, which is one reason consent records matter so much for marketing calls to older homeowners about reverse mortgages.
The same household split affects consent, and the rules on whether a subscriber or the phone’s regular user can consent are their own body of law. N.L. expressly left open what happens when one consented and the other didn’t.
Can a business or a professional plaintiff sue?
A business can sue under § 227(b), at least in the Ninth Circuit, while a plaintiff who buys phones to generate lawsuits has lost on statutory standing elsewhere.
In Chennette v. Porch.com, 51 home improvement contractors sued over texts sent to their cell phones. The district court dismissed them as outside the statute’s zone of interests. The Ninth Circuit reversed in October 2022. Because § 227(b)(3) covers entities as well as persons, the court concluded that “all of the plaintiffs have standing to sue under § 227(b) of the TCPA.” For the Do Not Call claims, the court held that “plaintiffs’ registered cell phones that are used for both personal and business purposes are presumptively” residential within the meaning of § 227(c). After discovery, a defendant can rebut that presumption with evidence of business use. The court’s factors include how the plaintiff holds the number out to the public and whether the carrier lists it as a business line. Business use and who pays the bill also count. Those factors matter in any case over calls and texts to business phone numbers.
In Stoops v. Wells Fargo Bank, a Pennsylvania federal court granted summary judgment against a plaintiff who had bought at least 35 prepaid cell phones. She bought them to receive collection calls and sue over them. The court held that her interests, “which include purchasing cell phones with the hope of receiving calls from creditors for the sole purpose of collecting statutory damages,” were not the kind the TCPA protects. That’s a district court ruling in another circuit, and a plaintiff in California will answer it with Chennette’s text-first reading of the words person or entity. The argument still earns its place when deposition testimony shows the phones exist to generate claims. It needs a record. A pleading-stage motion rarely has one.
Chennette relied in part on FCC orders for its residential presumption, and McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp. has since changed the weight those orders carry. District courts now “should interpret the TCPA under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation,” and they don’t have to treat the FCC’s reading as binding. Chennette remains binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit. A defendant still has fair room to argue how far the presumption should reach on facts the panel didn’t see.
Plaintiff status at a glance
| Who is suing | Claim and provision | How courts have treated it | Exposure if the claim stands | Defense angle |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subscriber of the number | Robocall or autodialer under § 227(b)(3), Do Not Call under § 227(c)(5) | Within the statute | $500 per violation, or up to three times that if willful or knowing ((c)(5) says “up to $500”) | Consent, the Duguid autodialer definition, Do Not Call exemptions |
| Regular user living at the home | § 227(b)(3) | Within the zone of interests under Leyse, and allowed to sue in N.L. | Same | Consent from the subscriber or user, and how often the person really uses the line |
| Houseguest or occasional visitor | § 227(b)(3) | Likely outside the zone of interests under Leyse | Same if the claim survives | Statutory standing motion under Rule 12(b)(6) |
| Business or contractor on a cell phone | § 227(b)(3) and § 227(c)(5) | May sue under (b) per Chennette, and a mixed-use cell is presumed residential for (c) | Same | Rebut the residential presumption with discovery on business use |
| Plaintiff who buys phones to collect claims | § 227(b)(3) | Outside the zone of interests in Stoops (W.D. Pa.) | Same if the claim survives | Deposition and discovery on phone purchases and litigation history |
Steps once a claim names a particular plaintiff
- Preserve the call and text records for the number, the dialer or platform data, and the consent record, under a litigation hold the day the demand arrives.
- Pull the opt-out and internal do-not-call history for that number, with dates, so the timeline of any stop request is fixed.
- Pull the Registry scrub results and the version dates used for the campaign that reached the number.
- Collect the vendor and lead-source contracts, the call scripts, and any recorded or AI-voice audio, along with whatever the lead record says about who owns the number.
- Talk to a lawyer before answering the demand, calling the claimant, or offering money, and before filing a first motion that may be the only clean chance to raise plaintiff-status arguments.
The firm’s TCPA litigation defense page describes how these claims move through state and federal court in California.
Questions businesses ask about TCPA plaintiffs
Does the TCPA plaintiff have to be the account holder?
For a robocall claim under § 227(b)(3), any person or entity can sue, and courts have allowed regular users who live at the number to bring it. The Third Circuit did so in Leyse, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed a verdict for a child who used his mother’s phone. Do Not Call claims are tied to a residential telephone subscriber, which gives defendants a firmer textual argument when the plaintiff isn’t the subscriber.
Is statutory standing the same as Article III standing?
No, Article III standing asks whether the plaintiff was concretely injured, and it limits the court’s power to hear the case. Congress decides statutory standing by choosing which kinds of plaintiffs get a right to sue. A defendant raises it under Rule 12(b)(6), as a merits issue. A defendant can lose one argument and win the other, so a motion to dismiss should consider both.
Can a company win by proving it meant to call someone else?
Under N.L. v. Credit One Bank, the answer is no: the intended person’s consent does not cover a call that reached someone else. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits had reached the same answer before it. A company calling reassigned numbers is exposed to the new holder, so the number’s current owner matters as much as the consent on file.
Are serial TCPA plaintiffs barred from suing?
No, a plaintiff who files many suits still has a claim if a covered call reached a line he actually uses. The defense gets traction when the evidence shows the phones exist to attract calls, as in Stoops. Litigation history, phone purchase records, and deposition testimony are what build that argument.
If your company is defending a TCPA claim
If your company is accused of calling or texting someone who was not your customer, the plaintiff’s tie to the number and the consent record behind each call usually shape the case. Rosenberger + Kawabata represents businesses defending TCPA lawsuits and class actions through its business litigation practice, including claims involving calls to reassigned numbers and shared household phones. Contact Rosenberger + Kawabata online for a confidential consultation, or call (310) 894-6921.
Sources
The statute is the Telephone Consumer Protection Act at 47 U.S.C. § 227. The FCC’s Do Not Call rules are at 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.
The court decisions are Leyse v. Bank of America National Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2015); N.L. v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 960 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2020); Chennette v. Porch.com, Inc., 50 F.4th 1217 (9th Cir. 2022); Stoops v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 197 F. Supp. 3d 782 (W.D. Pa. 2016); and McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146 (2025).
This post is general information about the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and related laws as of February 23, 2026. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Courts and the FCC change the rules in this area often, and the outcome of any claim depends on its facts. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes.