Are Texts Calls for Do Not Call Suits? Fall 2026 Rulings by Circuit

Whether a marketing text can support a Do Not Call lawsuit now depends on where the suit is filed. In September 2026, federal courts in four states dismissed Do Not Call claims built only on texts, following the Seventh Circuit’s July ruling that texts aren’t telephone calls. Courts in Pennsylvania, Texas, and California went the other way. A company that texts customers nationwide faces two rules at once, and the plaintiff’s choice of court can decide whether the defense ends the case.

What did the Seventh Circuit decide in Steidinger?

It held that the Do Not Call private right of action covers telephone calls, not texts.

In Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026), the court read the statute by its 1991 meaning and found “that texts are not calls, so § 227(c)(5) does not authorize the plaintiffs’ suit.” The opinion acknowledged that unwanted texts are a nuisance but concluded that they “do not fall within the private right of action created by § 227(c)(5).”

The statute is 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). It lets a person sue after receiving “more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity” in violation of the FCC’s Do Not Call rules. The argument that texts fall outside that language is the texts-are-not-calls defense. Steidinger binds federal courts in the Seventh Circuit. Everywhere else, it’s persuasive authority only.

Which courts have followed Steidinger since July?

At least four district courts, in four states and three circuits, between September 3 and September 23.

In Card v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., No. 1:26-cv-433 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 3, 2026), the court granted dismissal “because the TCPA does not create a private cause of action based on unwanted text messages.” The Fourth Circuit hasn’t ruled on the question.

In Conrad v. Hart Consumer Products, No. 4:24-cv-307 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 16, 2026), the court found that neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit had decided the issue, so it “writes on a blank slate,” and it granted dismissal with prejudice. In Reaves v. Worldwide Golf Shops, LLC, No. 5:25-cv-453 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 2026), the court concluded “that § 227(c)(5) does not apply to text messages” and dismissed without prejudice. And in Radvansky v. 1st Class Medical, No. 1:25-cv-3796 (D. Colo. Sept. 23, 2026), the court dismissed with prejudice “because plaintiff’s claim is based entirely on receiving unsolicited text messages, not telephone calls.”

Two features recur. Three of the four relied directly on the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp., and the fourth adopted Steidinger, which relied on it. McLaughlin held that district courts decide what the statute means for themselves, giving the FCC’s interpretation appropriate respect but not binding deference. And each case involved texts only, with no alleged voice calls to fall back on.

Which courts have rejected it?

Courts that treat the Ninth Circuit’s § 227(b) rulings as controlling, and two outside the Ninth Circuit discussed here.

In Miller v. S. Brown & Associates, Inc., No. 2:26-cv-01480 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2026), the court held that following Steidinger “would necessarily require this Court to reject Ninth Circuit precedent,” and it wrote: “The Court applies the governing law of this Circuit.” The defendant’s request to certify the question for immediate appeal also failed. The firm covered the Eastern District of California’s similar October ruling in its post on Steidinger and California courts.

Outside the Ninth Circuit, the reasoning differs. In Dovberg v. Haller Enterprises, Inc., No. 5:26-cv-4286 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2026), the court did its own statutory analysis, gave weight to the FCC’s rules, and quoted Third Circuit precedent holding that the TCPA “should be construed to benefit consumers.” In Feliciano v. Red McCombs Hyundai Northwest GP, L.L.C., No. 5:26-cv-00200 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2026), the court noted that “the Fifth Circuit has not ruled on this issue” and sided with district courts in Texas and elsewhere in the Fifth Circuit that treat texts as calls.

The table covers only the rulings discussed here. Other judges in the same circuits have ruled differently, and a single district court decision doesn’t bind the next judge down the hall.

What does the split mean for a company that texts nationwide?

That forum is now part of the defense, and the defense is worth raising everywhere except where it’s foreclosed.

Even if a company texts mostly California customers, plaintiffs can sue where the recipient lives, and a national class reaches every circuit. The texts-are-not-calls defense is a pure question of law, so it can be raised on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, before discovery costs mount. In the four districts that followed Steidinger, a defendant now has recent, on-point support. In the Seventh Circuit, the question is settled for now. California district courts have rejected it so far. Raising it there also preserves the issue for the Ninth Circuit. Leaving the argument out of a first response gives up an early, inexpensive shot at dismissal.

The defense also has real limits. It reaches only § 227(c)(5). It does nothing for claims under § 227(b) about prerecorded or artificial-voice calls, and the prerecorded-call count in Feliciano wasn’t challenged. It doesn’t reach state telemarketing laws that expressly cover texts, which the firm’s post on state mini-TCPA laws and texting describes. And it doesn’t change the FCC’s rules, which 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) applies to “telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls or text messages to wireless telephone numbers” to the extent described in the FCC’s 2003 order implementing the Registry. A company that wins dismissal of a private suit is still subject to FCC and state enforcement. The safer course is to keep scrubbing texts against the Registry and honoring opt-outs, and to treat the defense as a litigation tool, not a compliance plan.

Some defendants also pair it with a second argument: that a cell phone isn’t a “residential” line under the Do Not Call rule. Card and Conrad didn’t need to reach it, and Dovberg rejected it at the pleading stage.

Has any appellate court besides the Seventh Circuit ruled?

No other federal court of appeals has decided the § 227(c)(5) question.

The Ninth Circuit has held that texts are calls under § 227(b), and California district courts apply that reading to Do Not Call claims. The other circuits discussed here haven’t ruled. Conrad and Radvansky were dismissed with prejudice, and Card ended in a judgment of dismissal, so each could be appealed, and an appeal from any of them could produce the second circuit ruling.

When a texting claim arrives

For an overview of how these suits proceed, see the firm’s page on TCPA litigation defense. The first steps don’t change with the circuit:

1. Issue a litigation hold covering message logs, platform and campaign data, and the consent records for the plaintiff’s number.
2. Pull opt-out replies and the internal do-not-call list, with timestamps.
3. Gather the Registry scrub records and the Registry version used for each send.
4. Collect texting-platform and lead-vendor contracts, message templates, and any voice or prerecorded campaigns to the same number, since calls change the analysis.
5. Get counsel involved before answering a demand, contacting the sender of the claim, or discussing settlement, so the texts-are-not-calls defense isn’t waived or undercut.

Questions about the texts-as-calls split

Does Steidinger apply in California?

No. It binds federal courts in the Seventh Circuit only. The California federal courts that have ruled since Steidinger applied Ninth Circuit § 227(b) decisions treating texts as calls and declined to follow it. A California defendant can still raise the argument, which also preserves the issue for the Ninth Circuit.

If texts aren’t calls, can a company stop scrubbing texts against the Do Not Call Registry?

No. The rulings concern who can bring a private lawsuit under § 227(c)(5). The FCC’s rules still apply the Registry to marketing texts, state laws may cover texts expressly, and regulators can enforce both. Dropping Registry scrubs would trade a litigation defense for regulatory exposure.

Does the defense help if the company also called the plaintiff?

Only partly. Reaves and Radvansky noted that the plaintiffs alleged only texts. Two or more voice calls within a year can support a Do Not Call claim on their own, and prerecorded calls carry separate exposure under § 227(b).

Can a business move a case to a friendlier circuit?

Not on that basis alone. The plaintiff picks the court, often where the messages arrived or where the company is based. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), transfer depends on the convenience of parties and witnesses and the interest of justice, not on which circuit’s law favors the defendant.

Defending Do Not Call claims over marketing texts

If your company has been sued over marketing texts to numbers on the Do Not Call Registry, the circuit where the case is filed may decide whether the claim survives a motion to dismiss. Rosenberger + Kawabata represents businesses defending TCPA lawsuits and class actions through its business litigation practice, including claims involving marketing texts to numbers on the Do Not Call Registry. Contact Rosenberger + Kawabata online for a confidential consultation, or call (310) 894-6921.

Sources

The appellate decision is Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026). The district court orders are Card, Reaves, Conrad, Miller, Radvansky, Dovberg, and Feliciano. The statute is 47 U.S.C. § 227, and the FCC’s rules are at 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.

This post is general information about the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and related laws as of November 4, 2026. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Courts and the FCC change the rules in this area often, and the outcome of any claim depends on its facts. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes.